We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international …nancial architecture.
Introduction
Debt restructuring under the Brady plan of the late 1980s involved substantial losses for those banks lending to emerging markets as their loans were swapped into Brady bonds of lesser value. Understandably, lending to emerging markets since then has been mainly in the form of New York bonds 1 which are di¢cult to 'restructure' in this way, Buchheit and Gulati (2002) . This may be useful as a check on debtor's 'moral hazard' but it means that emerging markets are prone to …nancial crisis from other sources such as creditor panic or exogenous shocks to debt service capacity, as the current Latin American debt crisis demonstrates. Evidently, analysing why …nancial crises occur involves examining the behaviour of both creditors and debtors.
In the literature on …nancial crisis, two problems are commonly identi…ed, failures of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard -with greater attention given to the former.
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the two principal proposals to resolve sovereign debt crisis currently under consideration, namely revising bond contracts to include collective action clauses (John Taylor, 2002) or a court-ordered bankruptcy procedure (Anne Krueger, 2002 ) discussed further in the next section. In this respect, our proposals di¤er substantially from those of Jeanne (2001) where solving the creditor coordination problem has no impact on the debtor's incentive problem and leads him to recommend a 'crisis insurance fund' which bails out all governments facing a rollover crisis, conditional on …scal adjustment. The paper is structured as follows. The next section contains a brief account of recent proposals for improving international …nancial architecture, in particular the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) advocated by the IMF and collective action clauses recommended by the US Treasury. The analysis begins with a canonical two-player game of creditor coordination where no individual creditor can make a credible commitment to other creditors not to play a grab race, even when shocks are temporary. The criterion of risk dominance is brie ‡y considered as a principle of selection between the multiple equilibria. Next, we present a generic model of debtor moral hazard, where the sovereign debtor cannot credibly (or veri…ably) commit to putting in e¤ort ex-ante due to either sovereign immunity or non-contractibility of debtor payo¤s; nor can he commit to ex-post bargaining in the event of default. Then, we examine how the equilibrium selection in the creditor coordination problem interacts with the sovereign debtor's incentives and show that solving the sovereign debtor's incentive problems requires excessive 'project termination' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. Lastly, we consider potential improvements involving either SDRM or changes to contracts.
Various ways that issues of moral hazard and collective action are combined, on the assumption that both creditors possess identical information and that there is a …rst mover advantage to quitting if the debtor defaults are shown in Table 1 which indicates which cases are examined in detail below. The co-ordination game studied in Section 3 involves a pure liquidity crisis driven by temporary exogenous shocks where the appropriate solution for both creditors is to roll over their lending, see top left corner of Table 1 . If the shocks are permanent and large enough to imply insolvency, this will change the payo¤s available to creditors who roll over as they will have to take a write-down (see lower left); but, so long as the 'continuation value' lies su¢ciently far above 'liquidation value', the essential structure of the co-ordination game is unchanged -though it is not examined in detail in this paper. (For corporations in default, where assets of considerable value may be attached, shrinking continuation values typically lead to a prisoner's dilemma where quitting becomes a dominant strategy, Jackson (1982) : 4 but for sovereigns, one may continue to use the co-ordination game framework on the ground that there are typically not many assets that may be attached by creditors.)
When we consider debtor incentives in Section 4, it is with temporary exogenous shocks. Where bad e¤ort leads to temporary default but not insolvency, there will be no haircut if both creditors roll over, see second column. More generally, however, bad e¤ort will lead to a haircut, as shown in the top right, although to preserve the structure of the co-ordination game, the size of the haircut must not be too large.
2 Sovereign debt restructuring: Two mechanisms
Collective action clauses in bond contracts
After the Mexican crisis of 1994/5, the Deputies of the G-10 (Group of Ten Report, 1996) made a number of recommendations to facilitate crisis management. As regards liquidity provision, for example, they suggested that the IMF should 'lend into arrears' for countries whose domestic policies were deemed acceptable. For the private sector, they commended changes to contractual provisions covering sovereign debt (so as to allow for the collective representation of bondholders for supermajority voting on changing the terms and conditions of the debt contract: and for sharing of proceeds among creditors). Such ideas found academic support in the work of Eichengreen and Portes (1995) who recommended a creation of a Bondholders Council to help negotiate debt recontruction. But markets have proved very slow to respond. To date, only two sovereign debtors have incorporated such clauses in their foreign currency liabilities, but these are the UK and Canada and not the emerging market debtors for whom the recommendation was intended -probably because of a signalling problem (Eichengreen, 1999) .
The increasingly desperate case of Argentina has re-opened the debate on sovereign debt restructuring. 5 Thus in April 2002, John Taylor (2002) has, on behalf of the US Treasury, argued forcefully for the inclusion of collective action clauses in the emerging market debt. To help overcome the problem of transition, the US Treasury proposed adding substantial "carrots and sticks" as incentives to change. (Carrots could include lower interest rate charges when borrowing from the IMF; and further …nancial inducements to carry out bond swaps on the existing stock: as a stick, the insertion of such clauses could be made a precondition of seeking an IMF program.) To tackle problems of asset diversity, it was proposed that such clauses could be included in bank debt as well. As for problems of aggregation across creditor classes, it was proposed that disputes between creditors could be handled in an arbitration process provided for in the contracts themselves. 6 In their subsequent press release outlined principles for crisis management in emerging markets, the leaders of six private sector groups have acknowledged that "the use of of collective action clauses in individual sovereign debt contract would introduce a useful element of suppleness into the system", EMCA et al (2002, p.1), and indicated that e¤orts are being made to get an industry consensus on the most appropriate changes in sovereign debt documentation.
A sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
In the wake of the Mexican crisis, Je¤rey Sachs argued that sovereigns needed the basic protections available to corporate borrower and proposed an international bankruptcy court for sovereign debt restructuring. Rogo¤ and Zettelmeyer (2002) provide an account of this and other proposals for revising an international …nancial architecture to incorporate bankruptcy-style procedures.
The new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) …rst outlined by Anne Krueger in November 2001 was clearly inspired by the analogy of corporate bankruptcy procedures (Chapter 11, in particular). While collective action clauses also embody similar provisions for supermajority voting, the IMF claims that SDRM is necessary to solve the problems of aggregation and of transition (Anne Krueger, 2002, p.14) .
The di¤erent paths historically taken by Britain and United States in respect of corporate debt restructuring and how this is re ‡ected in the current debate on sovereign debt is summarised in Table2. Buchheit and Gulati (2002) who argue that the global economy should now follow the lead of the London bond market in adopting collective action clauses, might note that London market has subsequently gone on to develop court-ordered bankruptcy procedures analogous to the US Chapter 11. This suggests that the mechanisms may be complementary (Miller, 2002) . It may be easier in the short run to solve the transition problem of modifying bond contracts than it is to revise the IMF Article of Agreement. But there may be advantages in having explicit sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.
Both self-organising creditors and and international bankruptcy procedure are ways of creating commitment devices which help to prevent and resolve sovereign debt crisis 7 . To focus on issues of creditor co-ordination and debtor's moral hazard, the simple model of sovereign debt that follows abstracts from the aggregation and transition problems which play such an important role in the current debate. But it suggests that sovereign bankruptcy procedures combined with IMF-style conditionality can better achieve the commitment needed than would collective action clauses inserted in bond contracts.
3 Creditor co-ordination without moral hazard
Nash equilibria
Take the case of a sovereign embarking on a bond-…nanced investment project, costing K, which lasts only two periods. All the …nance is supplied by two investors, investing b each, who are promised a return of r in the …rst period and (1 + r) in the second period. So long as resources available cover these payments (i.e. cash ‡ow in period 1 is greater than 2rb and cash ‡ow in period 2 is greater than (1 + r)2b), all is well and the project will run to completion. 
Timeline of events: Liquidity shocks
Consider what happens if an unanticipated, exogeneous shock ('bad luck') lowers the capacity to pay in period one below the amount that is due to bond holders under their contract. If it is strictly a shock to liquidity, which is what we assume in this section, then project net worth will be unchanged. One example might be where a country is hit by contagion and the funds earmarked for debt service are suddenly withdrawn (as for Korea in 1998); another would be a sovereign debtor in a 'credit chain' forced into default by delays in payment by its creditors. Since failure to comply with the terms of the debt contract constitutes technical default, each creditor is entitled to accelerate its claim, demanding the capital sum as well as the current coupon owed in period 1, i.e. technical default makes the debt 'callable' in period 1 and exposes the sovereign to the risk of a liquidity crisis.
(Acceleration of the claim in this way normally requires a minimum percentage of creditors to act, say 25%: but in our two-creditor model, one is enough.)
The co-ordination game facing the two creditors is shown in Table 3 below where the actions of Creditor 1 (quit, stay) are indicated by rows 1 and 2 respectively; likewise for Creditor 2 by the columns. In the cells showing the resulting payo¤s, those for Creditor 1 are given …rst. (The signi…cance of L, the legal costs of accelerating one's claim, are discussed below.) Table 3 : How Payo¤s depend on Creditor Co-ordination
Symbols used and key assumptions made in determining the payo¤s are as follows. First, if either creditor accelerates its claim, the project will end (i.e. there is a minimum level of resources K 1 < K required for continuation, and (1 + r)b > K ¡ K 1 ) where Q < K is the recovery amount if the project is terminated in period 1. Second, the creditor who accelerates when the other does not, reckons to recover initial investment b plus interest rb minus the privately borne legal costs of quitting L-leaving the other creditor with the residual, Q ¡ (1 + r)b as in a grab race for a …rm's assets where liquidation allows the …rst mover to exit without much loss of value but liquidation is costly for other creditors. When both creditors quit, they split the expected recovery amount equally between themselves. (Most bargaining solutions support this assumption, including those of Nash and KalaiSmorodinsky.)
Third, we assume that unpaid interest is rolled-up and added to the coupon in period 2, so there is no loss of value to the bondholders if the project continues. If both creditors decide to stay, the payo¤s are as shown in the bottom right cell.
As is evident after normalising the payo¤s (see table 4 , where 1 > " > 0 > ± ), this coordination game has three Nash equilibria, two in pure strategies (Stay, Stay) with unit payo¤s and (Quit, Quit) with zero payo¤ and a third in mixed strategies where each creditor quits with probability q = 1¡" 1¡"¡± . Table 4 : Normalised expected, discounted payo¤s for the co-ordination game
The payo¤s of the normalised game are shown in Figure 1 together with three equilibria indicated at A, B and C. Pure strategy equilibrium represents a total coordination failure and the mixed strategy equilibrium B represents a partial coordination failure. How is one to select between these equilibria? One possible answer is that the equlibrium is selected by sunspots. Sunspots are random, payo¤-irrelevant states of nature which are publicly observed and are used by creditors to coordinate their expectaions and actions (see, for instance, Jeanne (2002), Peck and Shell (forthcoming)). Consequence of this approach is that sovereign debt crisis occur with positive probability: but the probability is entirely independent of the underlying economic fundamentals (an aspect which Morris and Shin (1998) criticise). A more satistactory theory of which equilibrium will be chosen lies, we believe, in the need to provide appropriate incentives for the debtor. 8 Before this approach is developed in the next section, consider the criterion of risk dominance. (Stiglitz, 2002a) believe that asymmetric information between creditors is main reason for excessive default, rather than the problem of debtor's moral hazard. In a complete analysis, it should be possible to combine asymmetric information problems with those of debtors moral hazard.
Risk Dominance
In this subsection, we use the criterion of risk dominance, originally proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1984) , to determine which of the two pure strategy equilibria will be selected. Let ® and 1 ¡ ® be the probabilities that player 1 attaches to the other player quitting and staying, respectively. Then expected payo¤s to quitting and staying for player 1 are "(1 ¡ ®) and 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)®. The condition for quitting to be strictly risk dominant (i.e. "(1 ¡ ®) > 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)®) is that j±j > 1 ¡ ". Thus quitting is risk dominant when the the gain to being the …rst mover is the creditor grab race is relatively large.
Assume that the pool of potential creditors includes some vultures who have access to a superior liquidation technology. (They may have lower legal fees and/or ways of accessing the overseas assets of the sovereign debtor.) Could it be a risk dominant strategy to sell to the vultures? The revised payo¤s are shown in Table 5 below. 
Note that since one gets more by selling to a vulture fund than by terminating the project, b " > " and assuming that not seling to a vulture cannot improve a creditor's prospects, b ± · ± < 0. Given these payo¤s, it turns out that selling to a vulture is risk dominant if
Comparing the two inequalities j±j > 1 ¡ " and¯b ±¯> 1 ¡ 2b " it is evident that quitting is more likely to be risk dominant when the pool of creditors includes a few vultures.
Sovereign borrowing with moral hazard
In solving the problem of creditor coordination, we have so far ignored the issue of sovereign debtor's moral hazard . This makes the analysis incomplete as any proposed solution to the creditor coordination problem will alter the incentives of the sovereign debtor. If the probability of project termination is reduced to zero, for instance, this may have the perverse consequence of actually increasing the possibility of sovereign debt crises, Barro (1998) , as a sovereign debtor may use the money borrowed from creditors unwisely. Indeed, it is possible (as established formally below) that a positive probability of termination may be needed to solve the moral hazard problem.
The model of debtors moral hazard developed here is of a small open economy where, as in Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989b) , the interest rate at which the sovereign can borrow in world markets is …xed. (For simplicity, dynamic interactions between creditors and sovereign debtors such as those involved in reputation models are ignored 9 .) Assume as before that 9 There is no loss of generality in doing so as Bulow and Rogo¤ (1990) have shown that reputation may the sovereign issues debt in period 0 which promises an interest coupon in period 1 and repayment the capital sum together with a second interest coupon in period 2. But before the …rst coupon becomes due, there are two events that may lead to default. First the debtor has to choose a level of e¤ort, either good and bad; and second an independently determined negative shock arrives with probability p. Since we are still looking at liquidity crises, bad e¤ort in this context involves condoning (or causing) cash ‡ows to be temporarily diverted so that debt interest due cannot be paid on time. (It might involve those in power shipping cash overseas in a ‡ight of capital which leads to default, for example.) We assume that either bad e¤ort or a negative exogenous shock is su¢cient to cause default but which of these is not immediately evident. If the causes of the technical default is revealed fairly soon ('early') i.e. before creditors have to decide before stay or withdraw, the delay is not signi…cant. But the problem of debtor's moral hazard arises when creditors have to decide whether to stay or withdraw before revelation takes place. 
Early
Later Never
When choice of effort is revealed Debtors choose non-contractible effort
Timeline of events
As shown in Figure 2 below, there are four possible out-turns in period 1, where it is assumed that with good e¤ort plus good luck the coupon can be paid, but not otherwise.
We assume that creditors are able to distinguish between a default caused by bad luck plus bad e¤ort and defaults due to only one of these factors; but they are unable to distinguish between cases of the latter. So, as the circle in …gure 2 indicates, they are unable to distinguish between default due to a bad shock (for example, a delay in receipt of payments due to the sovereign in period 1) combined with good e¤ort, and one due to just bad e¤ort -with no shock ( capital ‡ight , for example)c.
In the subgame following default, the co-ordination game facing the two creditors is shown in Table 6 below. 
The only new elements are the continuation values if both creditors choose to stay. As before, we assume that unpaid interest is rolled-up and added to the coupon in period 2, so there is no loss of value to the bondholders from a temporary exogenous shock if the project continues. But creditors will not be paid in full if sovereign does not choose to put in good e¤ort. Let p be the probability of a exogenous shock drawn by nature and h denote the hair-cut taken by creditors (due to bad e¤ort by the debtor) 10 . With probability p, each debtor obtains (1 + r)b at t = 2 while with probability 1 ¡ p, each creditor su¤ers a hair cut, h, at t = 2; therefore, conditional on the default at t = 1, the expected payo¤ to each creditor at t = 2 is (1 + r)bp
Normalizing payo¤s as before, the payo¤ matrix will have the same structure as before and therefore the set of equilibria remain unchanged. In this section, we will focus on the mixed strategy equilibrium where either creditor quits with probability q. Since either one leaving triggers disorderly default, the continuation probability is 1 ¡ ¼ c = (1 ¡ q) 2 where ¼ c is the probability of disorderly default.
What if the need to provide incentives for the debtor to put in high e¤ort is used as a principle for selecting equilibrium? Assume that the continuation outcome, where neither quits, cannot be the part of a sub-game perfect equilibrium where the debtor chooses to put in e¤ort (i.e. assume that a debtor, whose funding is guaranteed, will inevitably be tempted to put in low e¤ort). By contrast, the outcome where creditors quit for sure will certainly give debtor an incentive to put in e¤ort: but it is socially ine¢cient as any temporary exogenous shock will trigger a liquidity crisis. The mixed strategy equilibrium should provide some incentives the debtor: but will this be socially e¢cient?
Debtor moral hazard and incentive compatible randomisation
The source of moral hazard in our model is that the sovereign debtor has non-contractible payo¤s and the incentives of the sovereign debtor are not aligned with those of the creditors. Funded by resources borrowed in the international bond markets, we assume that the sovereign debtor receives 'private payo¤s' when the project terminates at t = 1 or at t = 2.
To begin with, we assume that these payo¤s are essentially non-contractible, i.e. cannot be attached by the creditors in settlement of their claims nor can the sovereign debtor make a credible commitment to transfer these payo¤s to the creditors. If funds are used to subsidise a public corporation, for example, the assets of the corporation are not attachable even though the sovereign has waived immunity: so these assets would count as private payo¤s. Funds transferred to private citizens fall in the same category: the added popularity of the government is not something that creditors can attach either. We further assume that the value of these debtor payo¤s depends on whether 'e¤ort' is good or bad, where good e¤ort implies that default only occurs with the bad exogenous shock but bad e¤ort implies that default is inevitable. Good e¤ort could correspond to a situation where, for instance, money is borrowed and used to promote R&D in the export sector to help the country remain internationally competitive. Bad e¤ort might correspond to transferring borrowed money to rich people who are free to put it in tax havens overseas, exposing the country to currency risk and the budget to a loss of tax revenue. (An alternative interpretation, suggested by James Tobin, would be that good e¤ort corresponds to properly regulated liberalisation of domestic …nancial markets and bad e¤ort corresponds to un-regulated …nancial liberalisation. 11 ) Let u G t and u B t denote the expected, discounted payo¤s (measured at t = 1) for sovereign debtor when the project is terminated at period t, t = 1; 2. We assume that u G t and u B t include both the residual value of the project …nanced by overseas borrowing net of debt service costs and also the private non-contractible bene…ts to the sovereign. Suppose u G t < u B t for all t. In that event, there is no solution to the debtor moral hazard problem without bankruptcy procedure because, ex ante, the sovereign debtor will always choose the bad e¤ort even if the project is terminated in period 1. The intermediary case, which we study below, is when u
. This is shown in …gure 3 where BB, the schedule showing expected payo¤ to bad e¤ort, is steeper than GG which gives the expected payo¤ to good e¤ort. If the probability of continuation 1 ¡ ¼, was equal to 0, second-period payo¤ would of course be irrelevant. As 1 ¡ ¼ increases to one, however, the prospect of continuation with high private bene…ts makes bad e¤ort ('shirking') more attractive. To ensure that the sovereign chooses good e¤ort, the probability of continuation must exceed 1 ¡ ¼ m where the two schedules intersect in …gure 3 i.e. there is a 'no shirking' constraint associated with debtor's moral hazard. As it is derived independently of creditor co-ordination, there is no reason why it should coincide with the continuation probability 1 ¡ ¼ c associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium for the creditors.
First, consider the case where the continuation probability generated by creditors is too high to satisfy the 'no shirking' constraint. To check moral hazard and induce e¤ort, creditors must select the pure strategy equilibrium of disorderly default for sure. But to have the debtor apply his best e¤orts only to face certain default is obviously socially ine¢cient.
These results are summarised in Figure 4 . On the vertical axis is plotted 1 ¡ ¼ c , the probability of continuation given the mixed strategy equilibrium of the creditor co-ordination game, while on the horizontal is plotted 1 ¡ ¼ m , the continuation probability required for time-consistency or 'subgame perfection' on the part of the debtor. The shaded part of the …gure shows the excess default probabilities relative to second best. 12 Figure 4: Excessive probability of disorderly default
Mixed strategy equilibrium of co-ordination game
Pure strategy of default Let 1 ¡ ¼ c denote the Nash equilibrium continuation probability (NEC). Then, 1 ¡ ¼ c = 1 ¡ q 2 = NEC when 1 ¡ q 2 < 1 ¡ ¼ m , NEC = 0 otherwise. Let 1 ¡ ¼ m denote the incentive compatability continuation probability (ICC). The above discussion is summarised as the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Almost always, NEC>ICC.
Proof. The truth of this proposition is evident from Figure 5 .
Why providing the right incentives for the debtor implies excessive crises is indicated graphically in four-quadrant …gure 5. Creditor payo¤s and three possible equilibria of the co-ordination game are shown top left panel. The non-contractible payo¤s to the debtor depending on whether e¤ort is not applied are shown in the top right panel, where the maximum probability of continuation compatible with good e¤ort, 1 ¡ ¼ m , is shown on the horizontal axis (below the intersection of GG and BB at I). How does this incentive compatibility constraint a¤ect the selection of equlibrium for creditors? Clearly it rules out equilibrium at A (stay, stay). It is, however, consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium at B. This can be seen using the transformation of continuation rates for individual players into continuation probability for the game as a whole (in the lower left panel) and comparing the resulting continuation probability 1 ¡ ¼ c with the incentive compatibility constraint (see the bottom right panel). The level of randomisation for creditor co-ordination is compatible with the debtor putting in e¤ort: but there is 'too much' randomisation in that higher continuation probability among creditors would also be incentive compatible. It is, in this sense, the market equilibrium is ine¢cient where the excess randomisation is indicated by the shading in the diagram. This ine¢ciency would greatly increase, however, if the continuation probability from the co-ordination game were to rise above 1 ¡ ¼ m (i.e. if point B were to approach su¢ciently close to C). In that case, the only credible equilibrium consistent with debtor incentive is where both creditor quit as soon as default occurs. The excess randomisation in this case, 1 ¡ ¼ m , is shown by the shaded box in the panel.
Only at the point E is the Nash Equilibrium randomisation equal to the incentive compatible randomisation. This leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of bankruptcy style procedures, there will almost always be excessive disorderly default in sovereign bond markets. Before considering policy iniatives to counter ine¢ciency, we consider brie ‡y how premature capital liberalisation might make it worse.
Possible perverse e¤ects of un-regulated …nancial liberalisation
Say, …nancial liberalisation makes it more attractive to pursue the bad e¤ort strategy, as would be true if, for example, unregulated capital account liberalisation makes it easier to ship money out of the country into foreign tax havens rather than keeping it at home in productive investment. In this case, liberalisation would, as shown in Figure 6 , generate a upward shift from BB to B'B'. As the intersection with GG moves to the left from I to I', this will reduce the incentive compatible continuation probability. If the incentive compatibility condition was still satis…ed at 1¡¼ c , this would, of course, have no e¤ect on equilibrium. But if not (as in the …gure), then the results are dramatic: in the face of default for any reason, only the threat of certain withdrawal will be su¢cient to check debtor's moral hazard. Is this simply a theoretical curiosum? As Tobin (1999, p.73) notes: "In the 'bailout' packages for East Asian economies, further cross-border …nancial liberalization was one of the conditions imposed by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury for o¢cial loans. This was a surprising requirement, given the evident facts that excessive private external short-term debt was, if not a cause of the crisis, a serious aggravation of it, and that banking and …nancial institutions seemed to need more regulations in several respects as well as fewer in other respects." Pressure to increase competition in …nancial markets may also be counterproductive in the absence of appropriate …nancial regulation. As Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) show, increased banking competition can lead to 'gambling' (i.e. choosing risky project with low social returns) in that case.
Sovereign bankruptcy procedures as a commitment device
We have seen that, in the absence of institutional innovation, there will be excessive disorderly default in equilibrium. Can this be reduced by institutional change?
Where creditors can exercise some legal claim over the assets of the sovereign state or its citizens in event of default, there is a good case for a bankruptcy procedure. This might involve the following elements. Ex ante, the sovereign agrees to bargaining in good faith after default, and to this end, establishes some 'contractability' on assets in favour of the creditors. This could involve waiving sovereign immunity, and agreeing, for example, that some overseas interest payments it receives could be diverted in favour of creditors as part of the bargaining process.
When a default occurs, however, the sovereign debtor is a¤orded protection by a temporary stay on creditor litigation. This legitimises the suspension of payments and also prevents litigation (by 'vultures') from inhibiting negotiations, Miller and Zhang (2000) . Furthermore, it provides a breathing space for a 'discovery' process where e¤orts are made to distinguish the underlying causes of default (and to determine whether it was due to a bad shock or poor e¤ort). If this reveals the debtor to have made appropriate e¤ort and to be su¤ering from an exogenous shock, bargaining would involve the lengthening of debt maturities for temporary shock and some write-down for a permanent shock known to be outside the control of the debtor. But if the debtor is revealed to have made little or no e¤ort to arrange its …nancial and …scal a¤airs, then its payo¤s are changed ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante. It is to to make this possible that the debtor must have agreed to make some private payo¤s contractible 13 Assuming the discovery phase allows creditors to discriminate between the two possible causes for default, the knowledge that such procedure is in place should reduce the moral hazard problem. This can be shown in …gure ?? where the ex ante agreement to transfer funds to the creditors in period 2 in event that default is discovered to be attributable to low e¤ort has the e¤ect of swivelling the BB schedule clockwise and increasing the maximum continuation probability as shown for example by 1 ¡ ¼ 0 m .
If ex ante contracting ensures that u B 2 is less than or equal to u G 2 , as shown by the lower dotted line the …gure, then the maximum incentive-compatible continuation probability shifts to one and the creditors can safely roll over their lending without fear of moral hazard. Even Before further discussing policy implications, we consider two special cases. First where the reasons for default are known as soon as it occurs, i.e without a discovery phase. In this case, there is no need for an extended bankruptcy procedure. If the default is due to an exogenous shock, liquidity can be provided right away. If the default is due to lack of e¤ort, then the debtor's payo¤s are changed ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante. This is perspective taken by Olivier Jeanne (2001) who argues that "the institution that brings the economy the closest to the …rst-best is a 'crisis insurance fund' that bails out all governments with a rollover crisis conditional on the …scal adjustment", (p.19, italics in the original). Under the proposed scheme, moral hazard is neutralized by denying bailouts to countries that have not implemented the …scal adjustment. But as Jeanne notes, the crisis fund would probably have to be a rule-based public agency because insurance contract cannot be made contingent on …scal e¤ort. 14 At the other end of the spectrum is the special case where the discovery phase is completely unrevealing, so the indeterminacy as to the causes of default can never be resolved. In these circumstances, the contractibility over private bene…ts cannot be exploited, and 'constructive ambiguity' appears to be the only solution where all defaulting debtors are bailed out with probability 1 ¡ ¼ m and the expected costs to creditors are re ‡ected in sovereign spreads.
Some policy implications
If it is true that …nancing development by issuing bonds exposes emerging markets to excessive crisis, the most obvious implication is to limit the use of such instruments, Rodrik (1998) . Some economists (e.g. Stiglitz, 1998 have discussed the use of explicit in ‡ow controls such as those used in Chile intended to change the composition of ‡ows in favour of longer term investment rather than hot money. 15 As Cordella (1998) points out, in ‡ow controls which succeed in shifting the structure of external …nancing may increase rather than decrease the total volume of …nance available for development: this is because "taxes on short-term capital ‡ows by avoiding rational panics, can improve the expected returns of investments in emerging markets, and thus increase the total volume of funds entering the country", (p.6). In time of crisis, however, the use of out ‡ow controls may well be considered, both as a way of conserving scarce foreign currency and of lowering domestic interest rates, Krugman (1998) .
In discussing various mechanisms for reducing global …nancial instability, Rogo¤ (1999, p. concludes that "the main problem with the present system is that it contains strong biases towards debt …nance". To mitigate this bias, he argues for a reversal of legal trends which have enabled creditors to enforce emerging markets debt contracts in industrialised country courts -e¤ectively recommending the restoration of sovereign immunity. He repeats a recommendation made earlier, Bulow and Rogo¤ (1990) of "restricting countries' ability to waive sovereign immunity as a means of discouraging the mediation of debt contracts in industrialized country courts", (p.38). It is acknowledged that this recommendation would lead to a contraction in the issuance of sovereign market bonds. He goes on to observe that "instituting an international bankruptcy court might be an alternative means to the same end", adding "I am assuming it would turn out to be toothless, but nevertheless would supercede domestic law."
The debate between John Taylor and Anne Krueger is, on the contrary, premised on widespread continuation of bond …nance for emerging markets countries without sovereign immunity, as is our own discussion of the bankruptcy procedure -where we see an important role for a rule-governed public agency to supply a commitment mechanism which makes private payo¤s accessible to the creditors ex post. It may be that the required control over the ex post behaviour of the debtor could be achieved by o¢cial "IMF conditionality" which governs the actions of the sovereign whose debt is being restructured. (Applicants for debt restructuring in the Paris Club are required as a matter of course to agree a programme with the IMF before negotiation with creditors begin.) Thus IMF programmes could play an important role in the international bankruptcy procedure described above. 16 To check moral hazard, of course, it would have to be known in advance that 'conditionality' would be used to achieve the contractibility of private payo¤s, i.e. the 'rules' need to be clear.
Could the required precommitment be achieved by private bond contracts? If as is customary, contracts are incomplete and involve creditors deciding what to do ex post, we believe that they are insu¢cient to the task. In other words, our analysis of the recent for excess volatility leads us to choose an SDRM mechanism rather than private contracts. But two delicate issues need to be considered: whose private payo¤s should be attached ex post; and to whom should responsibility for overseeing such attachment be delegated?
The former is the matter of political economy. What if, in a crisis, those responsible can exit, leaving debt for others to pay? In extreme cases, sovereign debtors may appeal to the principle of 'odious debt' where a state may justi…ably repudiate obligations incurred by tyrants no longer in power (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002, and Kremer and Jayachandran, 2001 ). But assuming that this does not apply, is it e¢cient or fair to punish those who could not exit? It appears that in Argentina, for example, rich and well-informed citizens were able to take their capital out of the country, thus avoiding the precipate depreciation of the peso. 17 If rich private residents have made enormous capital gains on exporting dollars from the country -now in default for lack of dollars to service its debt -should they not participate in the cost of clearing up the ensuing chaos? Capital gains on private dollars overseas in Switzerland are untaxable until realised. Could the state not demand payment of capital gains tax on the assets "marked to market", for example; or in extremis enforce repatriation in order to ensure the realisation of capital gains (and a massive in ‡ow of dollars)?
Even if one could think of such devices for making private payo¤s contractible, what public agency would be prepared to implement them? The IMF is willing to contemplate in ‡ow controls and standstills as part of an SDRM; but out ‡ow controls and enforced repatriation are, to put it mildly, inconsistent with its normal practices and procedures.
Conclusion
Solutions to the problem of creditor co-ordination in sovereign bond markets are subject to a moral hazard contraint: they must give debtors the right incentives to service their debts. In a model of sovereign illiquidity where there is a creditor co-ordination game with three equilibria, we …nd that this incentive contraint rules out the no crisis equilibrium. It can do so using emergency o¢cial funding and the IMF can impose conditionality so as to secure repayment? (Jeanne and Zettlemeyer, 2000 provide evidence that o¢cial funding is almost always repaid.) If this is known ex ante, is it not as if creditors can secure commitment from the debtor? Yes but, given the possibility of exit, they do not have the appropriate incentives: there is a problem of investor's moral hazard where private creditors fail to monitor. The bankruptcy procedures advocated by Anne Krueger explicitly prevent creditor exit so as to avoid this problem.
1 7 "It's true that Argentina has large external debt interest payments. But it also has substantial external debt income" According to Michael Gavin of UBS Warburg: "The net external interest burden is actually quite modest, external debt payments were $12.5 billion in 2000 or about 4% of GDP." But Argentines earned an estimated $6.4 billion or just over 2 % of GDP. For that the country should pay the price of default? (Smalhout, 2001 ). Informal estimates made at the IIE suggested that private external assets might amont to around $150 billion dollars, i.e. they might even match the public debt that has caused the collapse of the peso. selects either the mixed strategy equilibrium or the pure strategy where all creditors quit, depending on how severe the incentive problem is. Since, in general, the rate of termination is higher than strictly necessary for incentive purposes, this leads to a search for mechanisms to improve bond market e¢ciency. We discuss a bankruptcy procedure involving temporary stay on creditor litigation and discovery process for determining the underlying causes of default. A key element of the procedure is that when the sovereign debtor in default is found to have made little or no e¤ort, its private payo¤s will be reduced ex post. To provide the right incentives, it is crucial that the mechanism for doing this should have been agreed ex ante, as would be true if a ruled-governed public agency is involved.
Can privately issued bond contracts achieve the same result? Assume that the inclusion of collective action clauses in sovereign bond contracts can be implemented by bond swaps. Assume too that aggregation across di¤erent debt instruments can be e¤ected by two-stage bond swaps. Nevertheless the degree of commitment achievable with such contracts seems inadequate for the purpose. They are not re-negotiation proof. Some observers have suggested instead a return to sovereign immunity (Bulow, 2002 ) -as a way of making clear to creditors the degree of moral hazard involved: let the buyer beware. For our part, we believe that the institutional approach to sovereign debt restructuring proposed by the IMF is, in principle, capable to increase bond market e¢ciency. What the rules should be, and whether the IMF as currently constituted is the appropriate public agency, are issues to be discussed.
